Chief Audit Executive as Supervisory Board Member and Executive Compensation Contracts

This paper studies a unique phenomenon in China's corporate governance—that chief audit executives (CAEs) sit on supervisory boards (CAE duality)—and examines its effects on executive compensation contracts. Using a sample of listed firms between 2010 and 2018, we find a significant positive relation between CAE duality and pay-for-performance sensitivity, which suggests that the dual position helps integrate monitoring resources and reduces agency costs. This positive relation is more pronounced when companies face a stricter monitoring environment and in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in SOEs. In addition, we find that the recent reforms on compensation strengthen the role of CAE duality in SOEs. Further analysis identifies the reliability of performance information (i.e., earnings quality) and reduced executive self-interested behaviours (i.e., perquisite consumption) as the influencing mechanisms that increase the demand for performance-based compensation and thus improve pay-for-performance sensitivity.     

组织信息化环境下知识流动对组织创造力的影响

通过解析知识流动和组织信息化环境的内部构成，探究知识溢出/知识扩散、高管支持/ICT应用对组织创造力的差异性影响，以及不同组织信息化环境对知识流动与组织创造力关系的调节作用。利用信息化程度较高的企业数据，使用层级回归分析进行实证检验。结果表明：组织创造力受知识流动的正向影响，知识扩散对其的正向影响更强；组织信息化正向影响组织创造力，相比ICT应用，高管支持对组织创造力的正向影响更强；高管支持在知识溢出/知识扩散与组织创造力之间的正向调节作用显著；ICT应用对知识扩散与组织创造力的强化作用显著强于对知识溢出与组织创造力之间的调节作用。     

高管薪酬、董事会治理与分类转移

本文研究了高管薪酬和董事会治理对分类转移的影响。研究表明,货币薪酬会诱使高管向上转移利得,股权激励和缺乏区分度的薪酬制度会诱使高管同时向下转移费用和向上转移利得;而勤勉、独立和两职分离的董事会能够在一定程度上识别并抑制这两种不同方式的分类转移;但董事会对分类转移的抑制程度小于高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发程度。进一步地,良好的市场、法制和媒体监督环境能够有效缓解高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发作用,而董事会能够有效弥补法制建设和媒体监督不足导致的分类转移治理缺陷,并在较高质量的审计环境下对分类转移发挥更强的抑制作用。本文首次结合制度背景和媒体监督研究了公司核心治理机制对不同分类转移方式的影响和原因,并创新性地对向上转移利得的程度进行了衡量,为监管部门及公司治理机制、会计准则的制定者提供经验证据。     

高管学术经历能提高企业分红吗？

文章选取2008-2017年沪深A股3449上市公司的23193个样本数据，实证检验了高管学术经历与企业分红水平的关系。研究发现，相比于高管无学术经历的企业，有学术经历高管企业的分红水平显著更高。高管的学术经历通过缓解融资约束，而不是缓解过度投资的路径显著提高企业分红水平。在进一步的研究中，通过引入外部治理与企业产权性质影响因素，发现外部治理较弱、非国有企业的情况下，高管的学术经历对企业分红水平的提高作用更加明显。采用倾向得分匹配法（PSM）、工具变量回归等检验结果依然稳健。研究丰富了高层梯队理论与企业分红相关性的文献，发现了中国情境下影响企业分红的新因素。     

Independent director compensation,corruption, and monitoring

We find that independent directors in more corrupt countries receive greater pay. This relation could reflect outside directors in corrupt countries expropriating firm value, or it could reflect higher compensation for the additional effort required to lessen the negative effects of corruption. Acquirer acquisition announcement returns are lower in more corrupt countries, and this relation is mitigated by higher director pay. Higher director pay is also associated with greater sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance and moderates the negative effects of country‐level corruption on firm value. This evidence is consistent with higher director pay in corrupt countries incentivizing effort.     

Organizational governance and TMT pay level adjustment

This paper analyzes how the characteristics of boards and structure of ownership moderate a firm's capacity to adjust top management team (TMT) pay levels in the face of changes in its economic and complexity conditions. Using panel data from Spanish listed companies between 2003 and 2007, the results indicate that, over time, characteristics of corporate governance system contribute to give a fundamental importance to boards and ownership structure in the determination and adjustment of TMT pay. These associations appear to be even stronger than those that in other Western European and North American countries. Both the Spanish cross-holding and concentrated firms' ownership structure, and socially intervened boards play a major role in the high levels of pay received by the TMT, which, in turn, reflect a moderate adjustment of compensation practices to variations of surrounded environment factors.     

An investigation of the short‐ and long‐run relations between executive cash bonus payments and firm financial performance: a pitch

This letter is a discussion of the application of the pitch template developed by Faff (2015) to a financial accounting research topic. The pitch template focuses ideas into key areas, giving clear and concise direction in planning and structuring the research idea. In this instance, the template is used in a nonlinear manner to develop a research proposal to investigate the relation between cash bonus payments and firm financial performance.     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.     

Working capital (mis)management – impact of executive age

Several recent studies have used the upper echelons theory to explain the impact of personal traits of top executives on various corporate policies. In this, first of its kind, study we find that older executives invest more in working capital; take longer to convert inventories to cash; and pay their suppliers sooner. These findings are consistent with the argument that risk aversion increases with executive age. Our findings indicate that executive age has significant bearing on working capital management policies. This study also initiates new avenues in research relating behavioral aspect of executives with short‐term financial management.     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。